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AMERICANS WITH DISABillTIES ACT: AN ALLEGED 
VIOLATION OF THE ADA SHOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE 
IN A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
PROCEEDING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 
1990 to ensure persons with disabilities "equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency."! 
The ADA attempts to stop discrimination against persons with disa-
bilities,2 as well as expand the reach of the Rehabilitation Act of 
19733 to the actions of all state and local governments.4 To accom-
plish these goals, Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity5 from 
excluding an individual's participation in the public entity's services, 
programs, or activities based on the person's disability.6 In addition, 
Title II prohibits denials of the benefits of a public entity's services, 
programs, or activities on the same basis.7 
Many disabled parents face an even more daunting challenge 
in their lives besides the possible denial or reduction in their bene-
fits, namely the loss of a child. Now many disabled parents lose the 
right to raise their children based solely on their disabilities. As a 
result, disabled parents have attempted to cloak themselves in the 
ADA's protection as a defense in state termination of parental rights 
proceedings.8 Proponents of this argument justify using the ADA as 
a shield for parents because the State is a public entity; therefore, 
termination of their parental rights violates the ADA.9 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8) (Supp. II 1991). 
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). 
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV 1992). 
4. See id. 
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The ADA defines a public entity as: "(A) any State 
or local government; (B) any deparunent, agency, special purpose district, or 
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any other commuter authority 
(as defined in section 502(8) of title 45)." Id. 
6. See id. § 12132. 
7. See id. 
8. See infra Part V. 
9. See In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997) (concluding that the ADA does not 
apply to termination of parental rights proceedings because such "proceed-
ings are not 'services, programs, or activities' within the meaning of ... the 
347 
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Further, some parents argue that because they are disabled, 
states should provide "intensive family preservation services" to help 
them keep their children. lo However, these arguments have not 
been successfulY For instance, in In re G.M.,12 the court held that 
because the mother did not raise any ADA issues at trial she was 
precluded from doing so on appeal,13 and even if they were consid-
ered on appeal, the mother would lose because Social Services af-
forded "reasonable accommodations" in the form of services 
provided. 14 
In addition to unfavorable case law, parents face States that 
codified their own procedures for terminating parental rights. States 
differ regarding what constitutes termination of parental rights. 
Some do not require their agencies to offer any services to the par-
ents before the parental rights can be terminated.15 Others, includ-
ing Maryland, require services be provided to the parents in an at-
tempt to reunite the child with the parents before termination 
proceedings can begin. 16 
Many disabled parents whose parental rights are terminated suf-
fer from mental disorders and deficiencies, narcotics or alcohol de-
pendency, and the likeP In the cases decided since In re G.M., most 
courts have held that while a violation of the ADA is not a defense 
ill termination proceedings,18 parents can bring a separate action 
ADA"). 
10. In re C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 565-66 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (disagreeing with the 
mother's arguments that the ADA was violated). 
11. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
12. 526 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). 
13. See id. at 566. 
14. Id. 
15. See Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children and Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 
830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that "even a complete failure to provide ser-
vices cannot serve as a basis to attack the termination of parental rights") (cit-
ing S.E.S. v. Grant County Dept. of Welfare, 594 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ind. 1992». 
16. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (c) (2) (i) (1999) (listing one of the re-
quired considerations in determining to terminate parental rights as "the 
timeliness, nature, and extent of the services offered by the child placement 
agency to facilitate reunion of child with the natural parent"). 
17. See, e.g., Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 827 (addressing the termination of parental 
rights of a mentally deficient mother with an I.Q. of 67, and father with an 
I.Q. of 71); Robinson v. Washington, 896 P.2d 1298, 1300-01 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1995) (addressing the termination of parental rights where both parents were 
mentally impaired, and the father abused drugs). 
18. See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 830 (stating that while the ADA was enacted to protect 
persons with disabilities it was not "intended ipso facto to re-write state sub-
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against a public entity for allegedly violating their ADA rights. 19 For 
example, in one of the leading cases, Stone v. Daviess County Division 
of Children and Family Services,20 the court held that the ADA had no 
impact on termination statutes, and thus, if the parents' ADA rights 
had been violated their only remedy was to bring a separate 
proceeding.21 
While the ADA consists of five titles covering areas such as em-
ployment, public accommodation, and transportation,22 this Com-
ment concerns the ADA as it applies to Title II. The Comment as-
serts that an alleged violation of the ADA should not be a defense 
in termination of parental rights proceedings. As background for 
this assertion, Part II describes the termination of parental rights 
process in Maryland.23 Part III discusses the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, and the rights it affords parents 
to raise and direct the upbringing of their children.24 Part IV de-
scribes the history and the purpose of the ADA. 25 Part V analyzes 
state and federal case law regarding alleged ADA violations in termi-
nation of parental rights cases.26 Part VI discusses how Maryland 
courts may rule on the issue, as it is one of first impression in the 
State.27 The Comment concludes in Part VII that a violation of the 
ADA is not a valid defense against termination of parental rights.28 
stantive law."); In 11! B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding 
that "tennination of parental rights proceedings are not 'services, programs 
or activities' within the meaning of the ADA"); In 11! B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720 
(Vt. 1997) (holding that the "ADA docs not directly apply to [tennination of 
parental rights] proceedings"); In 11! Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the ADA is not a basis to attack a tennination of 
parental rights order, however, it may be a basis for a separate cause of ac-
tion). 
19. See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 829-30. 
20. 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
21. See id. at 830. 
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (employment); 12181-12189 (public accommoda-
tion); see also infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 29-104 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 105-75 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 176-215 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 216-320 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 321-64 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 365-68 and accompanying text. 
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II. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN MARYLAND 
A. Seroice Programs 
Legislative policy in Maryland requires the promotion of family 
stability, the preservation of family unity, and the assistance of fami-
lies in achieving and maintaining self-reliance.29 In accordance with 
this policy, each local Department of Social Services (DSS) devel-
oped a program offering services to families with children.30 These 
programs are available to families who receive temporary monetary 
aid or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) ,31 and families whose 
gross income is 80% or less than the median adjusted income for a 
Maryland family of similar size.32 These programs offer assistance 
where the family, faced with a crisis,33 needs help in locating and us-
ing community services,34 family counseling,35 or home management 
services.36 
B. Statutory Scheme 
Unfortunately, situations often exist where these services or 
programs are not enough. For example, where children continue to 
be abused37 and neglected,38 Subtitle Seven of Title Five of the Ma-
29. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4401(1) (1999). 
30. See id. § 4402(a). 
31. See id. § 4402 (a) (1). As part of the federal Social Security Act, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) provides funding for individuals who are over 65 years 
of age, blind, or disabled and have limited financial resources. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1381, 1382(a). 
32. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4402(a) (2). Maryland's median adjusted in-
come per family is determined by the Social Services Administration. See id. 
33. See id. § 4402 (b) (1). The crisis must be brought on by a devastating event 
such as loss of income, loss of home, physical or mental illness, death, deser-
tion, or abandonment. See id. 
34. See id. § 4402(b)(3). Such services include health services. See id. 
35. See id. § 4402(b)(2). Counseling would be given to resolve marital, family, or 
parent-child conflicts, or to help parents learn proper parenting skills. See id. 
36. See id. § 4402(b) (4). This counseling program teaches parents how to run 
their household and how to make and maintain a budget. See id. 
37. See id. § 5-701(b) (defining abuse as "the physical or mental injury of a child 
by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or cus-
tody or responsibility for supervision of a child ... under Circumstances 
that indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk 
of being harmed"). 
38. See id. § 5-701(r) (defining neglect as "the leaving of a child unattended or 
other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or 
other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibil-
ity for supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate: (1) that the 
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ryland Annotated Code, Family Law Article (Family Law Article) ad-
dresses this gap by protecting children against abuse and neglect by 
their natural parents.39 The subtitle governs custody, guardianship, 
adoption, and general protections against parental abuse.40 
This comprehensive statutory scheme requires police officers, 
doctors, nurses, health care practitioners, teachers, and human ser-
vices workers to report any belief that a child has been abused or 
neglected by hern parents.42 The report must be made to the local 
DSS or to a local law enforcement agency.43 There is also a statutory 
duty placed on the general public to make a report to the local po-
lice or DSS when reasons exist to believe that a child has been 
abused or neglected by her parents.44 
Subtitle Seven's statutory scheme directs DSS, once contacted 
by a teacher, doctor, neighbor, or other person alleging child abuse 
or neglect, to begin an investigation promptly.45 When physical or 
sexual abuse is alleged, DSS must investigate within twenty-four 
hours of the report,46 and when neglect or mental injury is alleged, 
the period for investigation is extended to five days.47 DSS then as-
signs a case worker to investigate the report, which begins by meet-
ing with the child.48 
While conducting an investigation, it is entirely appropriate for 
the social worker to check the child for bruises and other signs of 
abuse.49 If the child is of school age, the social worker may speak 
child's health or welfare is hanned or placed at substantial risk of significant 
hann; or (2) mental injury to the child or a substantial risk of mental in-
jury") . 
39. See generally id. §§ 5-701-715 (addressing child abuse and neglect). 
40. See id. 
41. Throughout this Comment the feminine fonn of pronouns will be used, how-
ever, as is obvious, the material in this Comment applies in a gender-neutral 
manner. 
42. See id. § 5-704 (a) . 
43. See id. 
44. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705(a). An example of this would be when a 
neighbor sees a parent abusing a child or leaving a child alone at home and 
then reports the incident to the police or DSS. 
45. See id. § 5-706(a). 
46. See id. § 5-706(b). 
47. See id. 
48. See id. § 5-706 (b) (1). 
49. See Interview with CJ. Messerschmidt, Assistant Attorney General, Department 
of Human Resources, in Baltimore, Md. (Feb. 11, 2000) (CJ. Messerschmidt 
works on appellate claims in the area of termination of parental rights) 
(notes on file with the author). 
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with and examine the child at schoopo If the child is not of school 
age, the social worker must go to the home to interview and ex-
amine the child.51 In addition, the social worker must attempt to 
have an at-home interview with the child's caretaker52 and make a 
determination as to the child's safety.53 To determine if the child 
has been mentally abused, the social worker will arrange for the 
child to be seen by two of the following:54 a licensed physician,55 a 
licensed social worker,56 or a licensed psychologist.57 
If the DSS investigation concludes that a child has been abused 
or neglected, DSS's initial goal is to keep the family together.58 To 
encourage this goal, the Maryland General Assembly codified sup-
port services that the State must provide to preserve family unity. 59 
These services must be offered to families before children are 
placed in the custody of the State.60 If an emergency situation ex-
ists,61 the child can be removed from the home into the custody of 
the State, and services will be offered to reunite the child and the 
parents.62 
However, often the services provided to the parents do not 
help. In these cases, an administrative hearing is necessary to deter-
50. Id. 
51. Id. If the parent resists allowing the social worker into the home, the police 
will accompany the social worker and make sure the social worker sees the 
child. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-709(b). 
52. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706 (b) (2). 
53. See id. § 5-706(b) (3). 
54. See id. § 5-706(c). 
55. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 14-101(g) (2000) (defining the qualifica-
tions of a licensed physician). 
56. See id. § 19-101(d) (defining the qualifications of a licensed social worker). 
57. See id. § 18-101(d) (defining the qualifications of a licensed psychologist). 
58. See COMAR 07.02.11.14.A (1999). 
59. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-401 (1) (i) (1999). The Department of Social 
Services (DSS) must offer functional services, family counseling, referral ser-
vices, and services concerning home management. See id. § 4-402(b) (2). DSS 
may also provide travel expenses to and from these services. See COMAR 
07.02.11.14.B. In an effort to help preserve the family, other services may be 
provided, which include, but are not limited to, day care services and voca-
tional counseling and training. See id. The vast majority of children in Mary-
land who come in contact with the foster care system are reunified with their 
parents. See Interview with CJ. Messerschmidt, supra note 49. 
60. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-401(2). 
61. An example of such a situation would be when a child has been left home 
alone with no one to care for her and someone contacts social services or the 
police. See Interview with CJ. Messerschmidt, supra note 49. 
62. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-525 (b) (1). 
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mine whether a child is a "child in need of assistance" (CINA) .63 
Once determined to be a CINA by the court, she may temporarily 
be placed in the custody of the State, and put in an out-of-home 
placement program.64 During that time, a permanency plan is estab-
lished for the child placed out of the home,65 with the goal to pro-
vide services to the parents so that the parents and child may even-
tually reunite.66 
There are times when no services can help to reunite the child 
and the parent.67 In these instances, the State does not have to 
meet its statutory obligation of providing services before removing 
the child from the home or terminating the parental rights of the 
63. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(e) (1998). A child who is 
deemed to be a child in need of assistance (CINA) "requires the assistance of 
the court because: (1) [t]he child is mentally handicapped or is not receiving 
ordinary and proper care and attention; and (2) [t]he child's parents, guard-
ian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to 
the child and the child's problems." Id. A child cannot be determined a CINA 
solely because the parent is homeless. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-
525 (c) (2)(i) (1999). The local DSS is responsible for finding the parent and 
the child shelter so they can remain together. See id. § 5-525 (c) (2) (ii). 
64. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-525(a). 
65. See id. § 5-525(b)(2). During the out-of-home placement, the local DSS is re-
sponsible for providing care for the child 24 hours a day. See id. § 5-525 (c). 
This out-of-home placement can be established through placement of the 
child into foster care, kinship care, group care, or residential treatment care. 
See id. at § 5-501 (m). This care is to be on a short term basis. See id. § 5-
525(c). 
66. See id. § 5-525 (b) (1). The best interest of the child is considered in developing 
the permanency plan. See id. § 5-525(e) (describing the development of the 
permanency plan and listing factors to be considered in determining a per-
manency plan that is in the best interest of the child). See also infra notes 81-
82 and accompanying text. 
67. See generally Robert F. Kelly, Family Preservation and Reunification Programs in 
Child Protection Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications far Legal Repre-
sentation, Judicial Practice and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L.Q. 359, 364 (2000) (plac-
ing children with biological parents was preferred although other arrange-
ments would be made if this was not possible); Susan V. Mangold, Extending 
Non-Exclusive Parenting and the Right to Protection far Older Foster Children: Creating 
Third Options in Permanency, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 835, 877 (2000) (discussing the 
necessity to plan for children in foster care who are not reunited with fami-
lies); Sean D. Ronan, Comment, No Discretion, Heightened Tension: The Tale of 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act in New York State, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 949, 968 
(2000) (according to New York's Adoption and Safe Families Act, reasonable 
efforts are not necessary to reunite children with biological parents whose pa-
rental rights to another child have been terminated). 0 
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natural parents.68 For example, in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 
J970013,69 the parental rights of a father were terminated without 
DSS offering services to help the family stay together.70 The court 
noted that the father had a significant interest in raising his child, 
but found that the best interest of the child71 was best served by ter-
minating the father's parental rights.72 Therefore, the court held 
that DSS did not have to provide any services toward the reunifica-
tion of the father with his child, as they would be futile. 73 
Again, in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, the court 
found providing services before terminating the parental rights was 
unnecessary.74 The court found that the mother was mentally ill and 
68. See In 111 Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 & CAA 92-10853, 103 Md. 
App. 1, 19-20, 651 A.2d 891, 900 (1994) (repeating that social services does 
not have to meet its statutory obligations to provide services before terminat-
ing parental rights "if no amount of services [would] result in reunification of 
the parent with his or her child"). 
69. 128 Md. App. 242, 252-56, 737 A.2d 604, 610 (1999) (holding that the termina-
tion of the parental rights of an incarcerated father was in the best interest of 
the child). 
70. See id. at 254-56, 737 A.2d at 611-12. The father had been convicted of drug-
related first degree murder and sentenced to 20 years to life in jail. See id. at 
246, 737 A.2d at 606. While in jail, the father participated in parenting classes, 
completed a drug program and attended group meetings on anger manage-
ment. See id. at 246, 737 A.2d at 607. The mother's rights were also termi-
nated, but she did not appeal. See id. at 245 n.l, 737 A.2d at 606 n.1. 
71. See id. at 252, 737 A.2d at 610; see also MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 5-525(e) 
(listing factors to be considered in determining what is in the best interests of 
a child); In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 & CAA 92-10853, 
103 Md. App. 1, 10-13, 651 A.2d 891, 896-97 (1994) (discussing the factors 
used to determine the best interests of a child). 
72. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. J970013, 128 Md. App. at 256-57, 737 
A.2d at 612. The court did not want to place the child's welfare in "legal 
limbo" because of the scant possibility that his father someday would be re-
leased. Id. 
73. See id. at 256, 737 A.2d at 612. The court found that the father was not able to 
provide the basic necessities for his child. See id. The father's situation was 
"persistent and ongoing," and he could be in jail for the rest of his life. Id. at 
256, 737 A.2d at 612. But see In 111 Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 
& CAA 92-10853, 103 Md. App. 1, 29-30, 651 A.2d 891, 910 (1994) (holding 
that when there is a short jail term, the State must try to reunite the child 
and father before termination proceedings would be justified). 
74. 335 Md. 99, 113, 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1993) (clarifying "that the controlling fac-
tor in adoption and custody cases is not the natural parent's interest in rais-
ing the child, but rather what best serves the interest of the child"). There, 
the mother suffered from severe mental illnesses. See id. at 106, 642 A.2d at 
205. She never had a permanent residence, often stayed in homeless shelters, 
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unfit to be a parent, and probably would never be fit to parent.75 
Thus, the court held that no services could help reunite the mother 
with her child,76 and the mother's parental rights could be termi-
nated without any services offered to her.77 
C. Permanency Plan 
As noted earlier, once the court determines that a child is a 
CINA, DSS must define a permanency plan.7s In creating a perma-
nency plan for the child, DSS considers what is in the best interest 
of the child.79 The factors that are taken into account when deter-
mining the best interest of the child include: the child's emotional 
bond to her parents and siblings; the child's emotional bond to her 
present caretaker; how long the child has been living with her pres-
ent caretaker; the potential harm to the child if she is removed 
from the home of her present caretaker; and the potential harm to 
the child if she remains in the custody of the State for a prolonged 
period of time.so 
When DSS devises a permanency plan for the child, the first 
consideration is to return the child to her parents or legal guard-
ian.s1 If that is not in the child's best interests, the second consider-
ation is to place the child with a relative who is willing to adopt or 
act as a guardian to the child.82 If there is no relative willing to 
adopt or act as a guardian, then DSS seeks foster parents willing to 
adopt the child.s3 
D. Termination Without the Natural Parents' Consent 
In order for the child to be legally adopted by foster parents 
without the consent of the natural parents, the court must termi-
nate the parental rights of the natural parents.84 The court must 
did not have a job, and did not try to get treatment for her mental condi-
tions. See id. at 118, 642 A.2d at 210-11. 
75. See id. at 118-19, 642 A.2d at 211. 
76. See id. at 119, 642 A.2d at 211. 
77. See id. 
78. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
79. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-525 (b) (2) (1999). 
80. See id. § 5-525 (e) (1). 
81. See id. § 5-525 (e) (2) (i). 
82. See id. § 5-525 (e) (2) (ii). 
83. See id. § 5-525 (e)(2) (iii). If the present foster parent does not want to adopt 
the child, then DSS will place the child with another approved adoptive fam-
ily. See id. 
84. See id. § 5-313(a); § 5-312(b). 
356 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 29 
find by clear and convincing evidence85 that it is in the best interest 
of the childs6 to terminate the parental rights of the natural par-
ents.S7 When making this decision, the court must consider several 
factors. 88 
Mter giving primary consideration to the safety and health of 
the child,s9 the court first looks at the services provided to the fam-
ily in an attempt to reunite the child with her natural parents.90 Sec-
ond, if an agreement exists between the parents and DSS, the court 
85. See id. § 5-313(a). The Supreme Court has held that a state must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to ter-
minate the parental rights of the natural parents, and that a lesser standard 
of proof is a violation of the natural parents' due process rights. See Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 74748 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State support its allegations by 
clear and convincing evidence before parental rights can be terminated). 
Some States have adopted the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt 
in termination proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 
(N.H. 1978) (mandating that the government must prove a case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt before the termination of parental rights can occur). 
86. The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the best interest of the child as 
the applicable standard in determining contested adoption and custody cases. 
See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561, 640 A.2d 
1085, 1096 (1994). 
87. In addition to finding that the termination of parental rights is in the best in-
terest of the child, the court must also find that one of three additional fac-
tors is present. The court must find that the child has been abandoned such 
that the identity of the child's natural parents is unknown, and no one has 
claimed to be the child's natural parents in the past two months; or the court 
must find that in a prior juvenile proceeding the child has been deemed a 
CINA, an abused child, a neglected child, or a dependant child; or finally the 
court must find that the following circumstances exists: the child has been out 
of the custody of the natural parent and in the custody of DSS for at least 
one year; the reasons for the removal of the child still exist or circumstances 
of a possibly harmful nature still exist; it is unlikely that the situation will be 
rectified so that the child could return to the natural parents in the near fu-
ture; and the continued relationship with the natural parents would be dam-
aging to a child developing a strong and solid relationship with a permanent 
family. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(a) (1999). 
88. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(c); see supra note 80 and accompanying 
text for an enumeration of best interest factors, as well as infra notes 334-35 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's standard in Maryland 
for terminating parental rights. 
89. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (c) (1). 
90. See id. § 5-313(c) (2)(i). The court will look into when the services were of-
fered, what kinds of services were offered, and the extent of the services of-
fered to the family. See id. 
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must determine if both parties to the agreement satisfied their re-
sponsibilities.91 Third, the court must consider the child's feelings. 92 
Fourth, the court assesses the natural parents' efforts to change 
their circumstances, behavior, and lifestyle, that led to the removal 
of the child.93 
When a child has previously been deemed either a CINA, a ne-
glected child, or an abused child, a court considers additional fac-
tors before parental rights are terminated.94 These additional factors 
include: (1) whether the natural parent has a disability that leaves 
the parent regularly unable to care for the child for extended peri-
ods;95 (2) whether the natural parent abused or neglected any child 
in the family previously;96 (3) whether the natural parent has con-
tinually failed to provide food, shelter, clothing, schooling, and any 
other necessary care to. the child, despite the natural parent's finan-
91. See id. § 5-313 (c) (2) (iii). 
92. See id. §§ 5-313 (c) (2) (iii),(iv). The child's emotional ties to her natural par-
ents and to her siblings will be taken into account, as well as her adaptation 
to home, school, and community. See id. 
93. See id. § 5-313(c) (2) (v). The extent to which the natural parents tried to have 
regular contact with the child in an attempt to be reunited with the child is 
also considered. See id. Incidental visits, however, are not given much weight 
by the court. See id. § 5-313(c) (2)(v)(1). The court also considers whether the 
parents are able to contribute financially to the child; whether the natural 
parents keep in contact with the child's current caretaker; and whether any 
further services would help to rehabilitate the parents so that the child could 
be returned. See id. §§ 5-313(c) (2) (v) (2-4). 
94. See id. § 5-313(d) (mandating that these factors be considered in addition to 
the factors in subsection c). 
95. See id. § 5-313(d)(1)(i). The disabilities applicable to this section include a 
mental disorder (defined in MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-101(£); 
mental retardation, (defined in § 7-101(l); alcohol dependance, (defined in 
§ 8-101(£); and drug dependance, (defined in § 8-101(l)). See MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAw § 5-301(c). However, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held 
that the fact that a parent is an alcoholic is not grounds by itself to remove 
the child from the home. See In re William B., 73 Md. App. 68, 73, 533 A.2d 
16, 19 (1987). The State must also show that the parent's drinking affects the 
parent's ability to care for the child. See id. The court of special appeals also 
held that a parent's incarceration does not constitute a disability. See In re 
Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 & CAA 92-10853, 103 Md. App. 1, 
29, 651 A.2d 891, 905 (1994) (holding that a father serving a nine month 
term was not under a disability). But see In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 
J970013, 128 Md. App. 242, 252-53, 737 A.2d 604, 610-11 (1999) (holding that 
although incarceration was not a disability per se, it was in the best interest of 
a child to terminate the parental rights of a father serving a 20 year to life 
sentence). 
96. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(d) (1) (ii). 
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cial ability to do SO;97 or (4) whether the child was born addicted to 
drugs or alcohol, and the parent refused to enter a detoxification 
program.98 
Furthermore, sometimes there are exceptional circumstances99 
that a court must consider when deciding to terminate the parental 
rights of the natural parents.1oo If a court decides not to terminate 
the parental rights, the child either remains in foster care or re-
turns home. 101 Reunification services should continue at this 
point.102 Nonetheless, the judge may still order termination of the 
parent's rights. 
Once the parental rights of the natural parents have been ter-
minated and the appellate process has been exhausted, the judg-
ment is final and irrevokable.103 The consequences of this drastic 
and permanent severing of the strongest and most basic relation-
ship led the Maryland Legislature and courts to ensure that termi-
nation of parental rights does not occur over parental objection, 
unless it is clearly justified. The welfare and best interest of the 
child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an 
objecting parent.104 
97. See id. § 5-313(d)(1)(iii). 
98. See id. § 5-313(d) (1) (iv). 
99. See In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561-62, 640 A.2d 
1085, 1096-97 (1994). 
100. See id. According to the court: 
The factors which emerge . . . include the length of time the child 
has been away from the biological parent, the age of the child when 
care was assumed by the third party, the possible emotional effect on 
the child of a change of custody, the period of time which elapsed 
before the parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature and 
strength of the ties between the child and the third party custodian, 
the intensity and genuineness of the parent's desire to have the 
child, [and] the stability and certainty as to the child's future in the 
custody of the parent. 
Id. at 561-62, 648 A.2d at 1097 (quoting Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191, 
372 A.2d 582, 593 (1977». 
101. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(d)(5). 
102. See id. § 5-524(2) (mandating that services should be provided to reunite the 
child with her parents after the child has been placed in foster care). 
103. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,759 (1982) (holding that a New York de-
cision terminating parental rights is final). 
104. Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1960) (recognizing 
the serious consequences of adoption on the relationship between child and 
the natural parent); see also Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 14, 497 A.2d 142, 148 
(1985) (remanding to the trial court to consider if adoption would be in the 
best interest of the child involved). 
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III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
prohibits any State from depriving "apy person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 105 The Due Process Clause pro-
vides individuals substantive l06 and procedural107 protections in mat-
ters that are so fundamental to life that they are beyond the reach 
of governmental interference. Because parenting is recognized as a 
fundamental right,108 governmental intrusion is only warranted in 
limited circumstances.109 Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause is used by parents in matters of family life. 
A. Parent's Fundamental Rights 
The Supreme Court first challenged a State's power to interfere 
with a parent's right in directing the upbringing of children in 
1923.110 The Court established a parent's right to "establish a home 
and bring up children" as one of the fundamental liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.111 
Recognizing that substantive due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment afforded a parent the right to direct the upbringing of 
their children, the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting the 
teaching of foreign languages at an elementary school. ll2 This early 
recognition of an area of family privacy, in which the State may not 
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
106. See infra notes 111-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substan-
tive safeguards afforded to families through the Due Process clause, and infra 
notes 135-36 for the minimum requirements needed to satisfy the substantive 
component of the Due Process clause. 
107. See infra note 134 and accompanying text for the requirement needed to sat-
isfy the procedural aspect of the Due Process clause. 
108. See infra note 133 for references to the fundamental importance of the par-
ent-child relationship. 
109. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text for an introduction of the 
States' permitted limitations on freedom; infra notes 137-38 and accompany-
ing text for a general discussion of States' authority to regulate; infra notes 
139-51 and accompanying text discussing States' police power regulation; and 
infra notes 152-58 explaining States' regulation under the doctrine of parens 
patriae. 
110. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parents have a 
fundamental right to teach their children a foreign language). 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 399. In Meyer, the Court stated that "[w]ithout doubt, [Due Process 
of the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the [parent] to ... bring up children. n [d. 
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interfere,113 set the stage for a series of subsequent cases that "fo-
cused on the right of parents to make important decisions regard-
ing their children's upbringing. "114 
Just two years later, the Court held in Pierce v. Society oj Sistersll5 
that the constitutional "liberty of parents and guardians" includes 
the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control. "116 The notion of family autonomy was reinforced 
when the Court invalidated a state statute requiring parents to edu-
cate their children in public schools.l17 The Court reasoned that 
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nur-
ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the 
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations. "118 
In 1944, the Court declared in Prince v. Massachusetts119 that 
"[i] t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside[s] first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include[s] preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder."l20 Although the State's regulation of child labor 
in this case prevailed over the guardian's desire to allow her nine 
year old niece to sell religious literature on a city street, the Court 
spoke of the importance of parental rights, emphasizing a "private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter."121 
Parental rights were further defined in 1972, when the Court in 
Wisconsin v. Yodd22 invalidated a state statute requiring all children 
to attend school until the age of sixteen.l23 Although the Court's de-
cision was largely based upon the First Amendment's Free Exercise 
Clause, the Court explicitly reasoned that "when the interests of 
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim ... more than 
merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the compe-
tency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's 
113. See id. 
114. See Holly L. Robinson,Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 
27,4849 (1985). 
115. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
116. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that Oregon Compulsory Education Act re-
quiring attendance at public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
117. See id. 
118. Id. at 535. 
119. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
120. Id. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925». 
121. Id. 
122. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
123. See id. 
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requirement under the First Amendment. "124 The Court expressed 
the significance of family autonomy by stating that "[ t] he primary 
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now estab-
lished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."l25 
By the 1980s, Justice Stewart made it clear in Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Seruices126 that the tradition of family unity and auton-
omy would continue to be a significant factor in cases involving pa-
rental rights. 127 He wrote that "[t]his Court's decisions have by now 
made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's 
desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody and man-
agement of his or her children' is an important interest that 'unde-
niably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing in-
terest, protection.' "128 
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly established that parents have 
a constitutionally protected right to direct many aspects of the up-
bringing of their children even though this right is not expressly 
stated in the Constitution.129 Believing that the "process of teaching, 
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the 
growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens,"130 
the Court continues to afford great deference to parental rights in 
many cases. 
B. The State's Rights 
Although parental rights are deemed fundamental liberties pro-
tected by the Constitution, they are not absolute. 131 Notwithstanding 
the Court's establishment of family autonomy and integrity, under 
certain circumstances the parent-child relationship may also be reg-
ulated by a State.132 
124. See id. at 233. 
125. See id. at 232 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925». 
126. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
127. See id. 
128. [d. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972». 
129. See id. 
130. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979) (Powell, j., concurring). 
131. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (clarifying that a parent's right to care for a child is 
important, but that a State may infringe upon the right if there is a legitimate 
interest). 
132. See supra notes 10, 18-21, 41-42, 44-57 and accompanying text. 
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1. Substantive Due Process Requirements 
State interference with a parent's rights is subject to judicial re-
view and must meet certain standards of procedural and substantive 
due process.133 Procedural due process requires the government to 
provide a fair procedure when depriving parents of their liberty in-
terest in rearing their children.134 However, when reviewing substan-
tive due process issues the Court is "concerned with the constitu-
tionality of the underlying rule rather than with the fairness of the 
process by which the government applies the rule to an individ-
ual."135 Substantive due process requires the Court "to examine a 
law, including a court ruling, [to determine] whether the substan-
tive rule of law is an unconstitutional limitation of life, liberty, or 
property interests. "136 
A State's authority to regulate is drawn from two distinct au-
thorities; the State's police power granted by the Constitution,137 
and the doctrine of parens patriaePS Under police power, the State 
133. See M.L.B. v. S.L]., 519 U.S. 102, 122-23 (1996) (holding that due process was 
violated when indigent mother was denied appeal of termination of parental 
right on the sole basis that she could not afford to pay mandatory fee for the 
preparation of a trial court record); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 
(1972) (invalidating a state statute requiring children to attend high school, 
because the statute violated the rights of Amish parents to educate their chil-
dren in a religious atmosphere); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35, (1925) (holding that Oregon Compulsory Education Act requiring attend-
ance at public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (striking statute forbidding parents to teach 
children a foreign language); In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. 
Rptr. 63 (1979) (upholding procedural and substantive due process challenge 
of the statute and process under which mother's parental rights were termi-
nated); see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONST. 
LAw, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 18.30 (West 3d. ed. 1999) [hereinafter "Ro-
TUNDA"] (stating that since the first parental cases in the 1920s, such cases 
continue to strongly weigh the fundamental constitutional importance of the 
parent-child and family relationships, and they cannot be terminated without 
meeting the standards of procedural and substantive due process). 
134. See ROTUNDA, supra note 133, at § 14.6. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. The Tenth Amendment is considered to be the source of state police power 
and provides that "[ t] he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 397400 (1923) (discussing state police power). 
138. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). 
"Parens patriae," literally "parent of the country," refers traditionally 
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is allowed to regulate certain family matters in order to promote 
family values!39 or matters of "public health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare."l40 The doctrine of parens patriae generally allows the 
State to act in the best interest of the child's welfare when a par-
ent's or guardian's control falters.141 
As the Court established in its earliest decisions, a State may 
not regulate parental rights with its police powers "under the guise 
of protecting the public interest."142 In order to justifY this levying 
of authority for the public interest under its police powers, the 
State must show that it is in the interest of the public at large, and 
not just a specific group of individuals. 143 The State must further 
Id. 
to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal dis-
ability, such as juveniles or the insane, and in child custody detenni-
nations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of 
the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who 
cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care 
and custody from their parents. 
139. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (validating a land use 
project which allowed taking of property despite landowner's claim "for rid-
ding an area of slums") (citing Bennan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954». "The 
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places. It is ample to layout zones where family values, youth values, and the 
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for peo-
.ple." Id. at 9. In Berman v. Parker, the Court noted: "Public safety, public 
health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more 
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to 
municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not 
delimit it." Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
140. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). In Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court validated a zoning statute for-
bidding "apartment houses, business houses, retail stores and shops" from res-
idential districts, and reasoning that "before the ordinance can be declared 
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, 
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare." Id. at 366, 395. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 
(1905) (holding that a compulsory vaccination law is a valid exercise of police 
power). 
141. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (recognizing that children "are 
assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control 
falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae"). 
142. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399400 (1923). 
143. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) ("To justify the state in thus in-
terposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear-First, that the 
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular 
class, require such interference . . . ."). 
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show that the means required for the achievement of the purpose 
are not unnecessarily oppressive. l44 When issues arise regarding the 
constitutionality of a state regulation under its police powers, the 
Court will balance the State's interest with the liberty interest of the 
parent's rights in raising children.145 
Some state regulations authorized under police powers are 
deeply rooted in the American tradition, generally accepted as com-
monplace, and often go unchallenged. Such regulations include 
child labor laws,l46 compulsory school attendance,147 mandatory vac-
cinations,l48 age requirement for marriage,149 prohibiting the sale of 
pornographic material,150 and criminalizing child abuse and 
neglect.151 
144. See id. ("To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the 
public, it must appear ... that the means are reasonably necessary for the ac-
complishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."). 
145. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("[A] State's interest in uni-
versal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balanc-
ing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests .... "). 
146. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("Acting to guard the 
general interest in youth's well being, the State as parens patriae may restrict 
the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting 
the child's labor, and in many other ways.") (citations omitted). 
147. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (holding that a State has 
the power to impose reasonable regulations of its citizen's education). 
148. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (" ... [u]pon the 
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right 
to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of 
its members.") 
149. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y 1981), afFd, 669 
F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982) (upholding New York's law 
requiring parental consent for marriages of persons between the ages of 14 
and 18). 
150. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("The well-being of its 
children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to regu-
late, and, in our view ... at least if it was rational for the legislature to find 
that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful."). 
151. See, e.g., Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 1978) (upholding the lan-
guage of a statute defining the offense of aggravated child abuse); State v. 
Fahy, 440 P.2d 566, 569-70 (Kan. 1968) (upholding a statute proscribing tor-
ture and abuse of child under 16 years of age); State v. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d 
445, 447 (Neb. 1985) (upholding a child abuse statute); State v. Lucero, 531 
P.2d 1215, 1218 (N.M. 1975) (holding that the objective of cruelty to children 
was a sufficient interest for the State to regulate under its police powers); 
State v. Fredell, 195 S.E.2d 300, 304 (N.C. 1973) (holding that a statute provid-
ing that any parent of a child less than 16 years of age who inflicted physical 
injury on the child by other than accidental means was guilty of the misde-
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The State's power of parens patriae for children is premised on 
principles that define and limit its power in interfering with family 
unity. First, there is a presumption that children lack the maturity 
and mental competence of adults.152 Second, recognizing that 
"[ t] he child is not the mere creature of the State, "153 the State must 
prove that the parents are either unable, unwilling or unfit to ade-
quately care for the child. 154 Third, the State must show that it is ex-
ercising its parens patriae power solely to advance the best interest 
of the child. 155 Finally, the State must show it is advancing a Q"com-
pelling state interest."156 
meanor of child abuse, was "a reasonable and proper exercise of the police 
power of the State"). 
152. "Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of 
themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, 
and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae." 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in result) ("[A]t least in some 
precisely delineated areas, a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for 
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. 
It is only upon such a premise ... that a State may deprive children of other 
rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to vote-deprivations 
that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults."); Parham v. J.R., 442 
U.S. 584, 603 (1989) ("Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not 
able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions . . . ."). 
153. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
154. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (unanimous Court). In 
Qy,illoin, the Court stated that there would be little doubt that the Due Pro-
cess Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were to attempt to force the 
breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their chil-
dren, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so 
was thought to be in the children's best interest." Id. at 555 (quoting Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., con-
curring in the judgment»; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) ("We 
do not question the assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from 
their children ... [however] the State registers no gain towards its declared 
goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents."). 
155. "Countless custody cases in all fifty states have used the standard phrase, 'the 
best interest of the child.'" Gregory A. Kelson, In the Best Interest of the Child: 
What Have We Learned From Baby Jessica and Baby Richard?, 33 J.M. ARLR 353, 
371 (2000). 
156. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) ("[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments' guarantee of 'due process of law' to include a substantive com-
ponent, which forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' lib-
erty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringe-
ment is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.") (citations 
omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (holding that a law re-
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When the State acts under the power of parens patriae, It IS 
generally to remove a child from a home or to terminate parental 
rights.157 When a parent's right threatens the welfare of the child, 
the State may regulate these rights to protect the child's welfare, 
safety, and best interest.15S 
2. Procedural Due Process Requirements 
As parental rights are important constitutional liberties, 
" [w] hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it 
must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. "159 In 
proceedings to terminate parental rights, the Supreme Court has 
determined "[t] he nature of the process due ... turns on a balanc-
ing of three factors: the private interests affected by the proceed-
ings; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and 
the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the chal-
lenged procedure." 160 
The Supreme Court has determined that procedural due pro-
cess requires the State to prove its case against a parent by clear 
and convincing evidence in proceedings to terminate parental 
rights.161 In Santosky v. Kramer,162 the Supreme Court refused to per-
mit the State to terminate a parent's rights.163 The Court overruled 
quiring high school attendance infringed upon the parent's right to direct 
the religious upbringing and education of their children; only those interests 
of the "highest order" can overcome those parental rights). 
157. See Cheryl M. Browing & Michael L. Weiner, Note, The Right to Family Integrity: 
A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 
GEO. LJ. 213, 214 (1979). 
158. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (recognizing that the 
State, empowered as parens patriae, may limit parents' rights where the 
child's safety is threatened); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) 
(recognizing that a State, acting as parens patriae, may restrict parents' rights 
to protect the welfare of the child); Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 
231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913) (recognizing that a State may restrict parents' con-
trol in order to guard a child's well-being by requiring school attendance). 
159. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982). 
160. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976». 
161. See id. at 765-68. The Court reasoned in Santosky that the use of a preponder-
ance standard would equate to near neutrality "between erroneous termina-
tion of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights." Id. at 
765. The Court reasoned that the preponderance standard was "constitution-
ally intolerable" because of the "relative severity" of the consequences of erro-
neous decisions in termination proceedings. Id. at 766-68. 
162. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
163. See id. at 747. 
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the State's decision to terminate, reasoning that a parent's liberty_ 
interest in raising her child is substantial, and thus the State must 
meet a higher burden of proof in order to interfere with those 
rights. l64 The Court stated that the higher burden of proof mini-
mized the risk of an "inappropriate termination" of parental 
rights.165 
The Supreme Court altered its trend of deference toward pa-
rental rights in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services. l66 There, the 
Court ruled that due process does not automatically require an indi-
gent parent to be appointed counsel in proceedings to terminate 
parental rights.167 Although the Court ruled in favor of the State, 
the Court reached its decision through a balancing test. 168 After 
finding a presumption that an indigent parent has a right to coun-
sel when her personal freedom is at stake, the Court measured the 
presumption against" [the] private interests at stake, the govern-
ment's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to 
erroneous decisions. "169 In balancing the three elements, the scale is 
weighed "against the presumption that there is a right to appointed 
counsel only where the indigent, if she is unsuccessful, may lose her 
personal freedom. "170 
Although the Court acknowledged that a "unique kind of dep-
rivation" is involved in parental termination proceedings,l7l the 
Court determined that the parent's interests in Lassiter did not re-
but the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel.172 In 
balancing the elements, the Court considered the detriment that 
the parent already caused her children to suffer, her lack of interest 
in prior parental rights proceedings, and the fact that counsel 
would not have altered the outcome of the case.173 
The Court made it clear in Lassiter that the right to counsel in 
parental termination proceedings involving indigent parents is de-
termined by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis, subject to appel-
164. See id. at 759. 
165. [d. at 764-65. 
166. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
167. See id. at 32-33. 
168. See id. 
169. [d. at 27. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at 26-27. 
172. See id. at 33. 
173. See id. at 32-33. 
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late review. 174 In effect, the Lassiter holding now requires an exami-
nation of whether procedural due process mandates appointment of 
counsel in all indigent parental termination proceedings.175 Thus, 
this process provides a protective measure for a child who suffers 
from a parent's lack of proper care or attention. 
IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Historical Purpose of the ADA 
Before the enactment of the ADA, the Federal Rehabilitation 
Act was the only civil rights legislation that afforded rights to the 
disabled. Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, all state programs 
and services receiving federal funding could not deny services to 
the disabled based on their disabilities. 176 Mter five years of re-
search, hearings, and discussions, Congress unanimously passed the 
ADA to combat discrimination of the disabled.177 The ADA ex-
tended the nondiscrimination policy of the Rehabilitation Act to all 
actions of state and local governments, regardless of funding. 178 The 
ADA seeks to assure the disabled are provided the same rights as 
the non-disabled by creating a cause of action for those who have 
faced discrimination because of disabilities.179 Congress determined 
that disabled individuals were being denied vital opportunities such 
as employment, education, housing, transportation, and health ser-
vices solely as a result of their disabilities.18o Congress designed the 
ADA to ensure that disabled persons are no longer denied public 
or private services, programs, or activities because of the unfounded 
fears, prejudice, or ignorance of others.181 
174. See id. at 31-32. 
175. See id. 
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
177. See DEPT. OF EDUC., OFFlCE OF CIVIL RlGHTS, ADA COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DlSABIUTIES Acr 1 (1990). 
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. II 1991). The Rehabilitation Act applied only to 
entities that received federal funding. See 29 U.S.C. § 701. The ADA encom-
passes much of the language of the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore the Re-
habilitation Act and its case law are important in interpreting the ADA. 
179. See 42 U.S.c. § 12101(b). 
180. See id. § 12101 (a)(3). 
181. See generally id. § 12101. (enunciating the ADA's purpose of eliminating dis-
crimination and providing standards, enforceable by the federal and state gov-
ernments). 
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B. Title II of the ADA 
Title II of the ADA requires public entities to provide physical 
access to programs and services offered.182 In addition, Title II en-
sures that such services and activities are readily accessible to, and 
usable by, qualified individuals with disabilities. 183 Denial of access 
to any program, service, or facility violates the ADA.l84 In order to 
prove that a violation occurred, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) that she has a disability,185 (2) that she is "otherwise 
qualified" for the benefit that has been denied, (3) that she 
was either excluded for participation in or denied benefits 
of some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or 
was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity, 
and, (4) that such discrimination was by reason of plaintiff's 
disability. 186 
The ADA defines a qualified individual as "an individual with a disa-
bility who, with or without reasonable modification to rules, poli-
cies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for 
the receipt of services or participation in programs or activities pro-
vided by a public entity."187 
Title II states that a person alleging an ADA violation may 
bring a complaint under the public entity's grievance procedure, 
file an administrative complaint with a corresponding federal 
agency or the Department of Justice, or file an individual com-
plaint.1ss However, Title II does not specify how to implement griev-
ance procedures.189 Rather regulations have been promulgated to 
address these procedures. These regulations seems to suggest that if 
182. See id. § 12132. 
183. See Watson v. Utah, No. 954190, 1996 WL 70521, at *8 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996) 
(per curiam) (re-emphasizing that the purpose of the Act is to assure the ac-
cessibility of programs and services to qualified individuals with disabilities). 
184. See id. 
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability of an individual under the ADA 
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual"). 
186. Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV 94-5796 ~D, 1996 WL 
684426, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996) (citing Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health 
& Hosps. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (setting forth the ele-
ments for an ADA violation». 
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994). 
188. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT CENTER, INC .. ADA TITLE II ACTION GUIDE FOR STATE 
& LOCAL GoVERNMENT 11-12 (1992). 
189. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.107(b) (2000). 
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the public entity already has other grievance procedures in place, 
the entity may use those procedures for complaints of ADA 
violations. l90 
The ADA Title II Action Guide191 recommends that when imple-
menting a grievance procedure, the procedure should specify in de-
tail how to file a complaint of an ADA violation.192 The procedures 
should also allow the decision to be appealed, and specify a reason-
able time period for a review and a decision on the complaint.193 A 
system should also keep accurate track of filed complaints, and the 
steps taken to resolve the complaint.194 
Title II specifies that when an individual brings their own law-
suit alleging a violation of the ADA, that person may receive injunc-
tive relief and attorney's fees and cost. 195 However, the individual is 
not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages.196 
C. State Defenses to Application of the ADA 
Exceptions exist to state compliance with Title II of the ADA. A 
state need not comply if it can show that compliance may cause an 
undue burden on the service or program, or reasonable modifica-
tions may fundamentally alter the nature of the service or program, 
or pose a direct threat to health or safety.197 
1. Reasonable modification 
The ADA allows reasonable modifications, unless the modifica-
tion "would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, 
or activity. "198 The ADA does not explicitly define "reasonable modi-
fications" but requires a state to "make reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures . . . where necessary" to avoid dis-
criminating against the disabled on the basis of their disability.l99 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of reasonable modifica-
tion as required by the Rehabilitation Act in Southeastern Community 
190. See id. 
191. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT CENTER, supra note 188. 
192. See id. at 41. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 35.175 (2000). 
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133; 28 C.F.R. § 35.175. 
197. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B. (2000). 
198. [d. § 35.130(b)(7); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). 
199. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b) (1). 
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College v. Davis. 2OO There, a woman with impaired hearing wanted to 
attend nursing schooI.201 The school determined that, in order to 
accommodate her disability, it would have to offer her a program of 
only academic work because it could not in, good conscience allow 
her to work on patients, even if they provided an individual faculty 
advisor every time she saw patients.202 The plaintiff argued the 
school should offer her the option of only academic work to obtain 
her degree or provide her with individual aid when she saw patients 
to allow her to safely participate in the nursing program.203 . 
The Court held that the plaintiff was not an otherwise qualified 
individual because "extensive modifications would be necessary to 
accommodate her. "204 The Court defined otherwise qualified as an 
individual who can meet all the requirements of the program in 
spite of their disability.205 The Court found that the modifications 
necessary would fundamentally alter the nature of the program and 
were more than that required by the reasonable modification re-
quirement of the Rehabilitation Act.206 
Using the Supreme Court's definition of "otherwise qualified," 
disabled plaintiffs appealing termination judgments will have 
trouble proving that they are "'otherwise qualified' for the benefit 
that has been denied. "21)7 It will be difficult because the benefit de-
nied is the ability to parent their children. In order for the court to 
terminate the parental rights, it would have found that the parents 
are not able ("qualified") to act as parents to their children.208 
200. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). When interpreting the ADA, precedent of the Rehabilita-
tion Act is used. See Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (dis-
cussing the deference given to the Rehabilitation Act, and how the Act does 
not always require an entity to undertake substantial modifications). 
201. See Southeastern Community College, 422 U.S. at 400. 
202. See id. at 407. 
203. See id. 
204. [d. at 410. 
205. See id. at 406. 
206. See id. at 410. But see Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that the university must provide a sign language inter-
preter to deaf student to participate in University programs). 
207. Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV 94-5796 RJD, 1996 WL 
684426 at *10 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996) (discussing, via the plaintiff's case, the 
difficulty complaintants face when alleging and organizing a violation of the 
ADA). 
208. See id. The court analogized their definition of "otherwise qualified" to the 
definition in Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, which 
held that within the context of employment an "otherwise qualified" person 
is one who can perform the essential functions of their job. See Bradley v. Uni-
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Therefore, they are not otherwise qualified for the benefit of 
parenting their children.209 
The ADA also specifies that the accommodations are not rea-
sonable if they require an undue financial or administrative bur-
den.210 The State has the burden of showing that it has examined 
all possible financial sources and cannot find the funding to pro-
vide the accommodations.211 
2. Direct threat 
Title II of the ADA allows the State to deny services, programs, 
or activities to individuals who pose a "direct threat" to the health 
or safety of others.212 If an individual. is classified as a direct threat, 
they are not an otherwise· qualified individual.213 The Supreme 
Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arlinfil14 balanced the inter-
ests of a disabled teacher with tuberculosis against the public safety 
concerns of the school in preventing the transmission of the disease 
to students. The Court held that a public entity may consider health 
and safety risks in determining if a person is otherwise qualified for 
services, programs, or activities.215 
Using the direct threat test, States could seemingly avoid follow-
ing the ADA where a parent threatens a child's health or safety. 
Where parental rights are terminated, a court has already decided 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is a threat to the 
health or safety of the child. Therefore, courts holding that the 
versity of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1993). 
209. See Morrison at *10-11. (highlighting the difficulty to be considered otherwise 
qualified) . 
210. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150; .164 (2000). 
211. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (2000). 
212. See id. § 36.208. 
213. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987). 
214. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
215. See id. at 288. In Arline, the plaintiff was fired from her job as a school teacher 
because she had tuberculosis. See id. at 276. The Supreme Court remanded 
the case and stated that to determine if a person poses a direct threat to 
health and safety of others, the court should consider the nature, severity, du-
ration of the disability, and the possibility of disease transmittal. See id. at 288. 
On remand, the district court found that the medical evidence showed that 
the plaintiff had been "cured" of tuberculosis and any chance that she could 
infect others was "so extremely small as to not exist." [d. at 292. The Court 
further stated that the plaintiff had been terminated not on the medical evi-
dence, but on society's myths about the disease. See id. 
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ADA does not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings 
could use the direct threat test to support the reasoning. 
V. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
A. Federal Court Decisions 
To date only three cases addressing use of the ADA in appeal-
ing a termination of parental rights judgment have been brought 
before the federal courts.216 In the first case, Watson v. Utah,217 the 
court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which the 
federal courts could grant relief, and granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss the complaint.21S The federal court stated that the defend-
ants were absolutely immune from suits for damages and dismissed 
the plaintiff's complaint.219 In Watson, the plaintiff initiated a law 
suit against the State of Utah and various state employees after her 
parental rights had been terminated, and sought money damages as 
well as i~unctive and declaratory relief.220 The plaintiff alleged, inter 
alia, a violation of the ADA claiming that her parental rights were 
terminated because she is blind.221 The district court granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed.222 On ap-
peal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held 
that the Eleventh Amendment gives States and their employees ab-
solute immunity from suits by its citizens seeking damages.223 The 
court further held that the claims for injunctive or declaratory dam-
216. See Watson v. Utah, No. 95-4191, 1996 WL 705219, at *7-8 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 
1996) (discussing the issues of deference and statutory interpretation that 
must be considered when focusing on the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA); 
Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV94-5796RJD 1996 WL 
684426, (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996); Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649-50 
(E.D. Mich. 1998), afi'd, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing the existing 
limited scope of the provisions of the ADA, underlining the idea that it is not 
a blanket statute under which to bring suit). 
217. No. 95-4191, 1996 WL 705219 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996). 
218. See id. at *1. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. The plaintiff admitted to being a substantiated child sex abuser. See id. 
at *2. 
221. See id. at *3. 
222. See id. at * 1. 
223. See id. (citing Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1525 (10th Cir. 1988». The 
court also held that the state prosecutors were entitled to qualified immunity 
for investigative functions and absolute immunity for activities "intimately as-
sociated with the judicial process." Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409,430 (1976) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993»). 
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ages were moot as by statute the only person who can bring a peti-
tion to terminate a parent's rights in Utah is the Attorney General, 
and the plaintiff did not name the Attorney General in her suit.224 
Additionally, the court wrote that the plaintiff had not been denied 
access to any service or program offered by the State, and thus 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.225 
Again in Bartell v. Lohiser,226 a federal court held that the de-
fendants had qualified immunity from the particular claim, and 
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment.227 There, 
the plaintiff's parental rights had been terminated.228~Instead of ap-
pealing, the plaintiff chose to bring a separate action alleging a vio-
lation of the ADA in terminating her parental rights.229 The plaintiff 
tried to commit suicide and had been hospitalized for depression.230 
Shortly thereafter, the Family Independent Agency (FIA) received 
complaints that the plaintiff abused her child.231 FIA then placed 
parental aids into the home to help the mother, but the attempts 
were unsuccessful, and the mother voluntarily placed her child in 
foster care.232 When the mother sought to bring the child home, 
the FIA petitioned the court for custody of the child.233 The court 
granted the petition, and the child remained in the foster home.234 
FIA then contracted with Lutheran Social Services (LSS)235 to pro-
vide services to the mother to help reunite her with her child.236 
The mother was given a number of services, but still was unable to 
care for her child. Consequently, LSS recommended to FIA that ter-
mination proceedings be initiated.2~7 The court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that the mother was unable to care for her 
child due to her mental and emotional conditions and the child's 
224. See id. 
225. See id. at *3. 
226. 12 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 
227. See id. at 650. 
228. See id. at 643. 
229. See id. at 644. 
230. See id. at 642. 
231. See id. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. at 643. 
234. See id. 
235. Lutheran Social Services (LSS) is a private company that the State contracts 
with to provide services to families in need. See id. 
236. See id. 
237. See id. 
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developmental problems.238 The mother brought a separate action 
suing the state agency, the individual employees of the State in-
volved in her case, and LSS and its employees.239 
The State argued that it and its employees were immune from 
suit, as well as LSS and its employees who were acting for the 
State.240 The mother argued that her parental rights had been ter-
minated because of her mental disabilities, and that determination 
violated the ADA.241 The court mentioned the numerous services of-
fered to the mother and stressed the fact that the mother did not 
offer any evidence that the State had offered services to non-
disabled persons and excluded her because of her disability.242 The 
court also stated that nothing in the ADA required a State to ignore 
a parent's disability when determining the parent's ability to raise a 
child, nor does the ADA require the provision of special services to 
the disabled.243 The court held that the government defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity and that the private employees 
were also immune as they were acting as an "arm of the state."244 
Therefore, the court granted the defendant's motions for summary 
judgment.245 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.246 The court held that 
the ADA does not negate qualified immunity for States and their 
agencies.247 The court found that LSS was acting as an arm of the 
State, and therefore, qualified immunity applied "with particular 
force to the foster care services provided by the LSS. "248 The court 
applied a two-step test to determine whether the State and its em-
ployees, including LSS, could properly assert qualified immunity in 
this case.249 The first step is whether a "clearly established" statutory 
or constitutional right has been violated.250 The second step is to de-
termine whether the state official acted unreasonably in light of the 
238. See id. at 650. 
239. See id. at 644. 
240. See id. at 645. 
241. See id. at 649. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. at 650. 
244. See id. at 645-46. 
245. See id. at 650. 
246. See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 560 (6th Cir. 2000). 
247. See id. at 556. 
248. Id. at 557. 
249. See id. at 557. 
250. Id. 
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"clearly established" right.251 The court held that the State did not 
violate the plaintiff's constitutional right to raise her child because 
the State's interest in the well-being of her child superceded the 
mother's interest.252 Therefore, the court found that qualified im-
munity was properly granted in this case.253 
The third case, Morrison v. Commissioner of SPecial Services,254 also 
was dismissed. There, the plaintiff filed an action alleging violations 
of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.255 The plaintiff contended that 
she was being discriminated against as she was refused custody and 
visitation of her children because she was an Mrican American, and 
because she had a mental illness.256 The plaintiff further claimed 
that she did not receive notice from the defendant of an intent to 
terminate her parental rights or notice that the defendant moved to 
stay an order returning visitation rights to the plaintiff.257 The plain-
tiff alleged that non-Mrican Americans were given this notice. 
The court pointed out that while the Supreme Court recog-
nized a parent's liberty interest in raising her children, that interest 
is not absolute.258 The court stated that the government has a com-
pelling state interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect, 
and parents do not have a constitutional right to rely on DSS to 
strengthen and reunite the parent with her children.259 The court 
found the plaintiff's claim that she did not receive notice was with-
out merit.260 The plaintiff did receive a copy of the motion to stay 
the order for visitation, which included the date and place where 
the family court would hear the issue, and no evidence was 
presented that non-Mrican American persons received more notice 
than the plaintiff.261 
251. Id. 
252. See id. at 558. 
253. See id. 
254. No. CV94-5796RJD, 1996 WL 684426 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996). 
255. See id. at *2. 
256. See id. 
257. See id. 
258. See id. at *3. 
259. See id. (quoting Marisol v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp 662, 677 (S.D.N.Y 1996». The 
court quoted from the Southern District Court of New York who stated that, 
"the only courts to apply the concept of family integrity to the child welfare 
context have done so when children in foster care were denied visitation with 
siblings and parents." Mariso~ 929 F. Supp. at 676. 
260. See Morrison, 1996 WL 684426, at *2. 
261. See id. at *3. 
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In Morrison, the court created a four-part test to determine if 
the ADA had been violated.262 Under the test a plaintiff must show: 
262. See id. The court derived this four-part test from the tests stated in Flight v. 
Gloeckler, and Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health and Hospitals Corp. See Flight v. 
Glocker, 68 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1995); Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health and Hosps. 
Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y 1996). 
In Flight, the plaintiff was disabled and confined to a wheel chair because 
he suffered from multiple sclerosis. See Flight, 68 F.3d at 63. He was a client of 
New York State's Office of Vocational and Educations Services for Individuals 
with Disabilities (VESID) for a number of years. See id. The VESID established 
an employment plan for him as a homemaker. See id. Although the plaintiff 
wished to purchase a van to accommodate his disability and requested finan-
cial assistance from VESID, its policy only provided for financial assistance to 
modify vehicles if the modifications were necessary in the pursuit of employ-
ment. See id. The policies allowed for 10,500 dollars if the disabled person 
would be the driver of the modified vehicle and 4,000 dollars if the disabled 
person was to be the passenger of the vehicle. [d. Plaintiff was not satisfied 
with the grant. See id. They determined that the plaintiff was too disabled to 
drive the modified vehicle and did not require the modified vehicle to work. 
See id. However, VESID offered to pay 4,000 dollars to help him modify the 
van despite their policies. See id. Thus plaintiff sued alleging violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act. See id. The court followed a four part test to determine if 
the Rehabilitation Act had been violated. The court stated that to prove a vio-
lation of the Rehabilitation Act section 504, a plaintiff would have to show: 
(1) that he has a disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, (2) 
that he is "otherwise qualified" for the benefit that has been denied, 
(3) that he has been "denied the benefits" solely by reason of his dis-
ability, and (4) that the benefit is part of a "program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance." 
[d. (citing Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981)). The 
court determined it had not. See id. at 64. 
In Lincoln, the plaintiffs were disabled children who had been receiving 
services from a clinic that was shut down because of cuts in the budget. See 
Lincoln, 920 F. Supp. at 491. The plaintiffs were not satisfied with the solution 
of being transferred to another clinic and filed suit alleging violations of the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 492. The court used a three part test to 
determine if there had been a violation of the ADA. See id. at 497. To establish 
a violation of Title II of the ADA, plaintiff must show that: "(1) he or she is a 
'qualified individual with a disability,' (2) he or she is being excluded from 
participation in or being denied the benefits of some service, program or ac-
tivity by reason of his or her disability, and (3) the entity which provides the 
service, program or activity is a public entity." [d. (citing Civic Assoc. of the Deaf, 
915 F. Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y 1996)). The court used a similar four part test 
to determine if there had been a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 
496. To prevail on a Rehabilitation Act claim a plaintiff must show: "(1) they 
are 'handicapped persons' under the Act; (2) they are 'otherwise qualified' 
for the benefit that has been denied; (3) they are being denied benefits solely 
by reason of their disabilities; and (4) the entity denying plaintiffs benefits re-
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(1) that she has a disability, (2) that she is "otherwise 
qualified" for the benefit that has been denied, (3) that 
she was either excluded from participation in or denied 
benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or ac-
tivities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the 
public entity, and (4) that such discrimination was by 
reason of plaintiff's disability.263 
The court ruled that the plaintiff could not prevail because she 
failed to satisfy the element requiring proof that she is other-
wise qualified for the benefit that she was denied. 264 The court 
held that the plaintiff was not qualified to act as a parent to her 
children.265 
Therefore, under the Morrison four-part test for determin-
ing an ADA violation of parents, most plaintiffs will have diffi-
culty prevailing in any actions. Obviously, if a parent's parental 
rights were terminated, a court has found her not qualified to 
raise and care for their children.266 Thus, under Morrison, a 
court will never find such parents otherwise qualified individu-
als as required in the four-part ADA test. 267 
B. State Courts and the Supremacy Clause 
The Supremacy Clause deems state law contrary to federal law 
to be without effect. 268 To determine whether a federal statute 
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause, the legislative in-
tent must be discerned.269 The purpose of the ADA is to "prevent 
old-fashioned and unfounded prejudices against disabled persons 
from interfering with those individuals' rights to enjoy the same 
ceives federal financial assistance." Id. (citing Flight v. Gloeckler, 68 F.3d 61, 
63 (2d Cir. 1995». The court found that the plaintiff's had failed to show a 
public service or program that had been offered to the non-disabled but de-
nied to the disabled. See id. at 496-97. The court wrote that the "disabled are 
not entitled to more public services than the abled receive, even if the dis-
abled need them." Id. at 497 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301-
02 (1995». 
263. Morrison, 1996 WL 684426, at *3. 
264. See id. at *4. 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
267. See id. 
268. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2. 
269. See Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children and Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 
830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citing California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987». 
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privileges and duties afforded to all United States citizens."27o The 
ADA was not meant, in and of itself, to re-write state substantive 
law.271 State courts have said that it was not the intent of Congress 
to change the substantive obligations imposed by unrelated state 
statutes.272 Therefore, the ADA has no impact on the operation of 
each state's termination of parental rights statute.273 The courts state 
that whether an ADA violation occurred is a separate action other 
than whether the court properly determined to terminate parental 
rights.274 This is why state courts have held that it is inappropriate 
for parents to use alleged violations of the ADA as a defense or to 
appeal a termination proceeding.275 
Other state courts have argued that even if the ADA does apply 
to the State's substantive law they have followed the ADA in their 
termination proceedings, and no violations have octurred.276 The 
first case reported on this issue was Stone v. Daviess County Division of 
Children and Family Services.277 There, both parents had extremely low 
IQ's278 and had five children who were deemed CINAs due to al-
leged sex abuse, malnutrition, dangerous living conditions, lack of 
270. Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV94-5796RJD, 1996 WL 
684426, at *3 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996) (quoting Galloway v. Superior Ct. of 
D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 20 (D.D.C. 1993»; see also Marisol v. Giuliani, 929 F. 
Supp. 662, 685 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to 
"provide reasonable accommodations for the handicapped"). 
271. See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 830. 
272. See In 71! Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); see also In 71! 
B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317-18 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "other courts 
have refused to graft ADA requirements onto unrelated statutes"); In 71! B.S., 
693 A.2d 716, 721-22 (Vt. 1997) (holding that ADA requirements are inappli-
cable to termination of parental rights proceedings). 
273. See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245; see also B.K.F., 704 So. 2d at 317; B.S., 693 
A.2d at 721. 
274. See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245; see also B.K.F., 704 So. 2d at 317; B.S., 693 
A.2d at 721. 
275. See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245; see also B.K.F., 704 So. 2d at 317; In re B.S., 
693 A.2d at 721. 
276. See In 71! C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the 
State made reasonable accommodations and termination was proper); In 71! 
Angel B., 659 A.2d 277, 279 (Me. 1995) (holding that a number of services 
had been offered and tailored to the mother's cognitive defects, therefore no 
ADA violation occurred); In 71! Welfare AJ.R., 896 P.2d 1298 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1995) (holding services had been offered to parents who were mentally defi-
cient and abused drugs and alcohol and termination was proper). 
277. 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
278. See id. at 827. 
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superVISIon, and truancy.279 While the parents began classes and 
counseling, the children were removed from the parents' home and 
placed in the custody of the State.280 Neither parent improved nor 
admitted that they were not properly caring for their children.281 
These services extended over four years, and the parents were still 
not able to properly care for their children.282 Consequently, termi-
nation proceedings were initiated, and the court terminated their 
parental rights.283 The parents appealed the termination, alleging an 
ADA violation.284 The parents claimed that social services had a duty 
to offer services that accommodated their mental problems.285 The 
court found that Congress did not intend the ADA to impact unre-
lated state substantive law; therefore, the ADA had no impact on 
termination statutes.286 Indiana's termination statute did not require 
any services to be provided to any parent before parental rights 
were terminated.287 If social services violated the parents' ADA rights 
in providing the services, the parents' only remedy was to bring a 
separate proceeding.288 
C. State Court Decisions 
Wisconsin decided the first case addressing whether a parent 
could use an alleged violation of the ADA as a defense to the termi-
nation of parental rights.289 That court held that the inquiry into 
279. See id. at 826. 
280. See id. at 826-27. 
281. See id. at 827. 
282. See id. 
283. See id. 
284. See id. at 829. 
285. See id. 
286. See id. at 829-30 (citing In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1994) ). 
287. See "id. at 830. Therefore, in this case, the Division of Children and Family Ser-
vices exceeded what was required by the statute. See id. at 831. However, the 
court explained that once an agency provides some services, "the provision of 
those services must be in compliance with the ADA." Id. at 830. Nonetheless, 
the services provided to the Stone's were tailored to their specific needs. See 
id. at 831. 
288. See id. at 829 (" [A]ny alleged non-compliance with the ADA ... in the provi-
sion of services . . . would be a matter separate and distinct from the opera-
tion of our termination statute."). 
289. See In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245-46; see also Wright v. Alexandria Div. of 
Social Servs., 433 S.E.2d 500 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). Wright was the first case seek-
ing to appeal a termination of parental rights judgment based on a violation 
of the ADA, but the court passed on the issue because it was procedurally 
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whether the father's rights under the ADA had been violated was 
separate and distinct from the issue of whether the trial court erred 
in terminating the father's parental rights.290 Wisconsin's termina-
tion statute required that diligent efforts be made to offer court-
ordered services to parents to try to reunite the parent and child 
before the parental rights can be terminated.291 
In In re Torrance P.,292 the Wisconsin court held that whether 
the State made a diligent effort to offer the court-ordered services 
must be considered by the "totality of the circumstances" of each 
case.293 There, the court found that the effort must be examined in 
light of the father's limitations, including his illiteracy.294 The Tor-
rence court emphasized that the duty to provide the court-ordered 
services was proscribed by the State termination statute, not the 
ADA.295 
The Torrance court further stated that the ADA does not in-
crease that duty nor does it proscribe how to perform that duty.296 
The purpose of an appeal is to determine whether the State has 
met its burden, under the state statute, in showing that it made a 
diligent effort to offer the court-ordered services in light of the fa-
ther's limitations.297 Neither the father's disability, nor the ADA 
changes that test or the State's burden of proof.29B 
The Torrance court determined that the ADA did not apply to 
the case, so it did not determine whether the State reasonably ac-
commodated the father's disability.299 The court instead held that 
the father's allegation of a violation of the ADA would have to be 
brought under a separate cause of action.3OO 
A Louisiana appellate court in In re B.KF.301 affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision that a mother with schizophrenia could not 
barred since it had not been raised at the trial court level. See Wright, 433 
S.E.2d at 505. 
290. See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245-46; see also supra notes 12-14, 18-21 and ac-
companying text. 
291. See WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2) (b) (1997 & Supp. 2000.·2001). 
292. 522 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
293. See id. at 245. 
294. See id. 
295. See id. 
296. See id. 
297. See id. 
298. See id. at 245-46. 
299. See id. at 246. 
300. See id. 
301. 704 So. 2d 314 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
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raise a violation of the ADA as a defense to her tennination of pa-
rental rights.302 The court determined that the ADA did not apply 
to tennination of parental rights proceedings because such proceed-
ings are not services, programs, or activities covered by the ADA.303 
The court noted that the mother should have filed a separate law 
suit to challenge an alleged ADA violation, and it refused to "graft 
ADA requirements onto unrelated statutes. "304 
The Vennont Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in 
In re B.S.305 In that case, a mother who was mentally retarded ap-
pealed the tennination of her parental rights alleging a violation of 
the ADA.306 The mother argued that if she were to receive assistance 
from the Lund Family Center she would be able to care for her 
child, and therefore be otherwise qualified.307 The court held that 
the ADA does not apply to termination proceedings because those 
proceedings are not programs, services, or activities as described by 
Title II of the ADA.308 The court noted that the family court is con-
cerned only with issues dealing with the child and cannot consider 
other issues such as alleged ADA violations.309 The court stressed 
that the ADA provides for a separate cause of action for violations 
of that statute; therefore, parents who allege a violation of the ADA 
should bring a separate law suit.31O 
A Washington appellate court upheld the State's tennination of 
a parental rights statute which provides that a State can take into 
account mental deficiencies when deciding to terminate parental 
rights.311 The court held that a statute is unconstitutionally applied 
when it has been applied arbitrarily.312 The court found that the evi-
302. See id. at 317. 
303. See id. 
304. Id. at 317-18. 
305. 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1997). 
306. See id. at 717. 
307. See id. at 717-20. 
308. See id. at 720; see also In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) 
(holding that a termination proceeding is not a service, program, or activity 
under the ADA and that the ADA does not provide a defense to or require 
special obligations in termination of parental right proceedings). 
309. See In re B.S., 693 A.2d at 721. 
310. See id. 
311. See Welfare of H.S. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 973 P.2d 474, 484 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) ("While the State is barred from arbitrarily removing 
children merely because the parents are mentally ill, the mentally ill are not 
immune from having their children removed if they are unfit. "). 
312. See id. at 483. . 
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dence presented in this case showed that the decision was not arbi-
trary.3I3 The record reflected the nature of the parents' illnesses and 
the effect the illnesses had on their ability to parent.314 That court 
also held that the ADA does not require public entities to provide 
services to the disabled that are not provided to other individuals.315 
To date, most state courts addressing this issue have held that 
ADA violations are not a defense to termination of parental 
rights.316 Other state courts have rejected the alleged violation of 
the ADA claims of the parents because the States provided services 
to the parents.317 However, those courts do not discuss if the ser-
vices provided met the statutory requirements, the ADA require-
ments, or both.318 Two state courts have held that if the ADA did 
apply, the services offered were enough and the ADA was not vio-
lated.319 Regardless of how the state courts reached their decisions, 
they all hold that the ADA did not provide a valid defense to termi-
313. See id. The court stated, "[ t] he findings recite in detail the affirmative evi-
dence on which the court relied in establishing current unfitness." Id. 
314. See id. 
315. See id. at 48l. 
316. See, e.g., J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761, 768 (Ark. 1997) (stating that the 
"parent's rights under the ADA must be subordinate to the p"rotected rights 
of the child"); Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 
N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In re B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct. 
App. 1997) (holding that the "ADA may not be used as a defense in a parental 
rights termination case"); In re John D., 934 P.2d 308, 314 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating that when "the evidence [is] sufficient for the ... court to find that 
[the parent] was responsible for the destruction of the parent-child relation-
ship despite reasonable efforts by the Department, ... the ADA could not be 
used under the facts of this case to shift that responsibility"). 
317. See In re C.M., 526, 566 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
reasonable accommodations were made); In re Welfare of L.L., No. 20483-5-11, 
1997 WL 677961, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the mother did 
not meet her burden of showing that the statute was unconstitutional and 
that the state statute violated the ADA); In re Joshua R., No. 15381-9-III, 1998 
WL 465203, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that "services previously pro-
vided to them were sufficiently tailored to address their disabilities ... "). 
318. See, e.g., In re Joshua R., No. 15381-9-III; In re Welfare of L.L., No. 20483-5-11, 
Angel B., 659 A.2d 277 (Me. 1995); Robinson v. Washington, 896 P.2d 1298 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
319. See In re Angel B., 659 A.2d at 279 (stating that the State "offered a number of 
services that took [the parent's] pace and cognitive skills into account"); 
Rnbinson, 896 P.2d at, 1302-03 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the state-
provided services were modified to accommodate the parents specific disabili-
ties) . 
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nation of parental rights.320 
VI. MARYLAND LAW 
A. Issue of First Impression 
1. Maryland Courts Look to Other Jurisdictions for Guidance 
In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633,321 the court was faced 
with a family law issue of first impression. In that case, foster par-
ents wanted an opportunity to be heard when the foster children 
they were caring for were removed from their home and adopted 
by another couple. They alleged that their due process rights had 
been violated because they had a statutory preference to adopt the 
child, and they were not given a hearing or opportunity to adopt.322 
They contended that they had a protected liberty interest as foster 
parents and should be heard.323 
Maryland's highest court has held that where there is an issue 
of first impression, the court must examine authority from other ju-
risdictions for guidance in deciding the issue under Maryland law,324 
therefore the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland looked at the 
precedent of other courts who had decided that issue. Those courts 
320. See, e.g., Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 
824 .(Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In 1li B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314 (La. Ct. App. 1997); In 1li 
John D., 934 P.2d 308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761 
(Ark. 1997). 
321. 101 Md. App. 274, 646 A.2d 1036 (1994). 
322. See id. at 293, 646 A.2d at 1045. 
323. See id. 
324. See Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 241, 539 A.2d 637, 644 (1988). In Harris the 
court was confronted with an issue of first impression as to whether successive 
sentencing of a defendent was cruel and unusual punishment. See id. The 
court noted that a majority of other jurisdictions that had addressed this issue 
had held that a successive sentencing of a defendant did not amount to cruel 
and unusual punishment. See id. at 241, 539 A.2d at 644. Thus, the court of 
appeals, after examining these cases from other jurisdictions, held that succes-
sive sentencing did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 
241-42, 539 A.2d at 644-45. Again, in Albert S., the court of special appeals was 
confronted with an issue of first impression. See In 1li Albert S., 106 Md. App. 
376, 664 A.2d 476 (1995). The court looked to other jurisdictions and noted 
that other state courts had consistently held that where an off-duty police of-
ficer "steps outside the sphere of legitimate private action" the Fourth 
Amendment applies to his conduct. Id. at 386, 664 A.2d at 481. After review-
ing the state courts' decisions, the court came to the same conclusion as the 
other state courts and held the Fourth Amendment applied to the off duty of-
ficer's conduct. See id. at 38&-92, 644 A.2d at 481-84. 
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held that foster parents do not have a protected liberty interest and 
that foster care allows the state to have ultimate control over the 
children while they are being cared for on a day-to-day basis by a 
foster family. As such, the State creates any relationship that exists 
between the foster family and the foster child and that relationship 
is deemed to be temporary; therefore, no state-created rights or lib-
erty interest exists in the foster parents.325 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded that after 
reviewing the other courts' precedents on the issue it was "obliged 
to conclude" that foster families do not have a protected liberty in-
terest.326 From the interpretation of these cases, Maryland courts 
when faced with an issue of first impression follow the precedent es-
tablished by other courts where those courts have consistent 
holdings. 
2. Other Jurisdictions and the Use of the ADA as a Defense in Ter-
mination of Parental Rights Proceedings 
As the use of the ADA as a defense in a parental rights termi-
nation proceeding is an issue of first impression in Maryland, other 
jurisdictions must be examined.327 Two federal courts have ad-
dressed this issue and held that states are entitled to qualified im-
munity in ADA actions; therefore, the ADA is not a defense in ter-
mination of parental right proceedings.328 The federal court in 
Bartell stated that there is nothing in the ADA that requires a state 
to ignore a parent's disability when determining their ability to raise 
325. See In re Albert S., 106 Md. App. at 294-95, 646 A.2d at 1046 (citing Kyees v. 
County Dep't. of Public Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that foster families have more limited liberty than natural or adopted fami-
lies»; Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family and Children's Servs., 563 
F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978) (holding that 
the foster relationship is temporary); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28 
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (observing that " [fJoster parents do not have a cognizable lib-
erty interest in maintaining a relationship with a foster child"); Sherrard v. 
Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728, 742 (W.D. Mich. 1980), affd, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 
1981), em. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981) ("[AJny expectation of 'family' con-
tinuity or permanency based upon the provisional foster family license ... 
was totally unreasonable."). 
326. In re Albert S., 101 Md. App. at 292, 646 A.2d at 1095. The court also stated 
that after reviewing the other court decision on this relevant issue they fol-
lowed what the other courts decided but were "reluctant" in that decision. [d. 
327. See supra Part VI.A.l. 
328. See Watson v. Utah, No. 954191, 1996 WL 705219 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996) Bar-
tell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d. 640 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 
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their child, nor does the ADA require special services to be pro-
vided to the disabled.329 
The federal court in Morrison determined that the ADA does 
not apply where a court terminates a parents rights because the par-
ent is not an otherwise qualified individual.330 The court concluded 
that the plaintiff was not qualified to act as a mother to her child.331 
Other state jurisdictions have held that a violation of the ADA 
is not a defense to a termination of parental rights proceeding, be-
cause an inquiry into an ADA violation is separate and distinct from 
whether the court erred in terminating a person's parental rights.332 
Other state courts have held that a violation of the ADA is not a de-
fense to a termination of parental rights proceeding as such pro-
ceedings are not services, programs, or activities covered by the 
ADA.333 
The fact that a number of state and federal courts have consist-
ently held that the ADA is not a defense to termination of parental 
rights is significant in determining whether Maryland should follow 
suit. Since the state and federal courts may differ on the reason why 
the ADA is not a defense in a termination proceeding, it is helpful 
to look at Maryland's position on termination, and how it has ap-
plied the ADA in other settings. 
B. Maryland s Current Position on Termination of Parental Rights 
Maryland recognizes the substantial interest that a parent has 
III raising her child, which is protected by the Constitution, com-
329. See Bartel~ 12 F. Supp. 2d at 650. 
330. See Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV94-5796RJD, 1996 WL 
684426, at *4 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996). 
331. See id. 
332. See, e.g., J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761, 766-fJ7 (Ark. 1997) (finding that a 
mother did not establish the Department of Health Services violated the ADA 
since denial of visitation was based on the best interest of the child rather 
than on the disability of the parent); Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children 
and Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding the State 
did not violate the ADA in terminating parental rights of parents of limited 
intelligence); In 1l? John D., 934 P.2d 308, 314 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing she is a "qualified individual 
with a disability" to establish an ADA violation); In 1l? Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 
243, 246 (Wise. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that Congress did not enact the ADA 
to change obligations imposed by unrelated statutes). 
333. See In 1l? B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the ADA pro-
vided no defense to termination of a schizophrenic mother's parental rights); 
In 1l? B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997) (finding no specific discrimination 
against disabled persons in the termination process). 
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mon law and statute. Because of the substantial interest involved, 
Maryland has developed a detailed statutory scheme to be used in 
termination of parental rights proceedings.334 In addition to satisfY-
ing these statutes, the court must find by clear and convincing evi-
dence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate paren-
tal rights. This heightened standard of proof is required by due 
process protections guaranteed to the biological parent.335 
Although the rights of a parent to raise their child is substan-
tial, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has been clear in stating that 
in adoption and custody cases the controlling factor is not the 
rights of the natural parents, but instead what is in the best interest 
of the child.336 The court has stated "in all cases where the interest 
of a child are in jeopardy the paramount consideration is what will 
best promote the child's welfare, a consideration that is of 'tran-
scendent importance.' "337 
In order to determine what is in the best interest of the child 
in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court must con-
sider subsections c and d of section 5-313 of the Family Law Arti-
cle.338 One factor in section 5-313(d) provides that in determining 
what the best interest of the child, the court must consider whether 
the parent has a disability of alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness, 
or mental retardation339 which prevents the parent from properly 
caring for her child.340 If the court finds this to be the case it can 
relieve social services of the obligation to provide services to reunifY 
the parent and child.341 While section 5-313(d) may seem to discrim-
inate against individuals with the enumerated disabilities, the courts 
have made clear that the disability alone is not enough to terminate 
parental rights.342 As a further safeguard against discrimination, the 
disability has to make the parent unable to care for the child now 
334. See Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw, §§ 513(c)(d) (2000). 
335. See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 828. 
336. In 111 Adoption Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 559, 640 A.2d 1085, 
1095 (1994). 
337. See In 111 Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 114, 642 A.2d 201, 
209 (1993). 
338. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
340. See MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (d) (1)(i). 
341. See Mo CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(d) (3); see also In 111 Adoption/Guardian-
ship No. J970013, 128 Md. App. 242, 253, 737 A.2d 612, 610 (1999) (finding 
the termination of parental rights of a father serving 20 years to life in prison 
was something that might never occur). 
342. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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and in the future. 343 Ensuring a child's safety and stable living ar-
rangements must come before the interests of the parents. 
The court of appeals has further held in In re Adoption/Guardi-
anship No. 1094]344 that where the mother has severe mental disor-
ders, is unfit to care for her child, and may remain unfit to care for 
her child indefinitely, attempts at reunification services would be fu-
tile and DSS does not have to offer assistance.345 In that case, the 
mother suffered from schizophrenia for many years.346 She moved 
from month to month sometimes living in homeless shelters, was 
unemployed, and refused to get help for her mental disorder. 347 
The court found that she was unfit to care for her child and that 
her situation was not a "temporary crisis" nor the result of a "string 
of bad luck. "348 The court stated that DSS did provide a reasonable 
amount of assistance to reunify the parent with her child but even 
if they had not the termination would have been proper.349 Al-
though the ADA was not considered in this case, the holding, along 
with the statutory counterpart, seems to agree with courts that have 
found the ADA does not apply because termination proceedings are 
separate and distinct from alleged violations of the ADA.350 
C. Maryland Law on ADA Violations in Court Proceedings 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that a violation of 
the ADA cannot be used as a defense in a court proceeding.351 In 
Green v. North Arundel Hospital Association,352 a minor brought a medi-
cal malpractice action against a hospital and some physicians for 
failing to identify the shunt in his brain as malfunctioning, resulting 
343. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 119, 642 A.2d 201, 
210-11 (1993). 
344. 335 Md. 99, 642 A.2d 201 (1993). 
345. See id. at 117-18, 642 A.2d at 210-11. 
346. See id. at 118, 642 A.2d at 210-11. 
347. See id. 
348. See id. at 118-19, 642 A.2d at 211. 
349. See id. at 117, 642 A.2d at 210. 
350. See, e.g., J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1997); Stone v. Daviess County 
Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In re 
John D., 934 P.2d 308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243 
(Wise. Ct. App. 1994). 
351. See Green v. North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n., 126 Md. App. 394, 417-18, 730 A.2d 
221, 234 (1998) (finding a disabled child who was in a vegetative state did not 
have the absolute right to attend his medical malpractice trial as an observer). 
352. 126 Md. App. 394, 730 A.2d 221 (1998). 
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in a vegetative state.353 The trial judge bifurcated the trial on the is-
sues of liability and damages.354 The defendants in the case made a 
motion in limine to exclude the plaintiff from the courtroom dur-
ing the liability portion of the triaP55 The trial judge granted the 
motion on the basis that the plaintiff was not able to assist counsel, 
testify on his own behalf or even understand what was occurring in 
the proceedings.356 At the conclusion of the case, the plaintiff ap-
pealed inter alia that his exclusion from the trial was a violation of 
the ADA.3S7 The court of appeals held that a party does not have an 
absolute right to attend trial.358 The court held that 
[F]ederal regulations implementing the requirements of the 
ADA state: A public entity shall make reasonable modifica-
tions in policies, practices or procedures when the modifica-
tions are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that 
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the na-
ture of the service, program or activity.359 
The court found that the ADA did not apply in that case.360 The 
court stated that the ADA provides only for injunctive relief and 
does not allow a judgment between two private parties to be 
reversed.361 
Assuming the ADA applied and had been violated in this case, 
the court held that the plaintiff's only recourse would be to bring a 
separate action against the judge in his official capacity since the 
ADA only allows for an action against the public entity for prospec-
tive relief.362 
Having taken this approach to the ADA, it seems that the court 
of appeals would agree with other courts who decided that a viola-
353. See id. at 398, 730 A.2d at 223. 
354. See id. at 400, 730 A.2d at 224. 
355. See id. 
356. See id. 
357. See id. at 401, 730 A.2d at 224-25. 
358. See id. at 417, 730 A.2d at 234. 
359. Id. at 415-16,730 A.2d at 233 (quoting 28 C.ER. § 35.130(b)(7) (1999»; see also 
Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th 
Cir. 1997), cere. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997) (finding that a public transit sys-
tem's policy requiring disabled participants to re-certify that they are disabled 
did not discriminate against participants on the basis of their disability). 
360. See Green, 126 Md. App. at 417, 730 A.2d at 233. 
361. See id. 
362. See id. at 416-17, 730 A.2d at 233. 
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tion of the ADA is not a defense to a termination of parental rights 
proceeding because they are separate and distinct proceedings. Fur-
ther, the court in Green stated that if the ADA applied and had 
been violated the plaintiff's only recourse would be to bring a sepa-
rate action.363 This is consistent with other state courts' holdings 
that a parent's only recourse would be to bring a separate action al-
leging a violation of the ADA.364 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act is intended to protect peo-
ple with disabilities from discrimination.365 It is not intended to pre-
empt state law regarding termination of parental rights.366 There-
fore, alleging a violation of the ADA is not a valid defense against 
termination of parental rights.367 However, a violation of the ADA 
gives to a parent a separate cause of action.368 
While Maryland has not yet decided this issue, it seems likely 
that a Maryland court would follow the lead of a number of other 
state and federal courts, allowing a separate claim for alleged viola-
tions of the ADA. However, such actions would not allow parents to 
defend termination of parental rights by claiming violations of the 
ADA. 
jennifer Wright Burke 
363. See ill. 
364. See supra Parts V.B-C. 
365. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
366. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text. 
367. See supra note 350 and accompanying text. 
368. See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
